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'Playola' and Fraud on Digital Music Platforms: 
Why Legislative Action is Required to Save the 
Music Streaming Market 
CHRISTINE SMITH BURTON*© 
 
Music streaming fraud has become a prevalent evil within the music industry. 
Fake streams cost the industry an estimated $300 million a year.1 Unfortunately, the 
existence of music streaming fraud is hard to establish,2 leaving insufficient proof to 
prosecute or file suit. In April of 2018, however, Focus Media, Inc. filed a complaint 
against Streamify in the United States District Court of the State of Maryland for 
Streamify’s practice of music streaming fraud.3 The Court transferred the case to the 
Southern District of Texas due to jurisdictional issues.4 But, based on the analysis of 
the Maryland Court, the case will likely be removed from litigation and forced into 
arbitration.5 Neither the public nor the industry will have any further information on 
how a United States Court may interpret allegations of music streaming fraud or if 
Focus Media was able to produce enough evidence to establish a fraud claim against 
Streamify.6   
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1. See generally Elias Leight, Fake Streams Could Be Costing Artists $300 Million a Year: As Streaming 
Platforms Grow, Indie Labels Are Becoming Increasingly Concerned About How the Numbers Can Be 
Manipulated, ROLLING STONE (Jun. 18, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-
features/fake-streams-indie-labels-spotify-tidal-846641/. 
 2. See generally Amy X. Wang, Music Streaming Has a Nearly Undetectable Fraud Problem, QUARTZ 
(Mar. 15, 2016), https://qz.com/615359/steady-chunks-of-money-are-being-quietly-illicitly-stolen-from-music-
streaming/. 
 3. See generally Focus Music Entm’t, LLC v. Streamify, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205912 (Dec. 5. 
2018). 
 4. Id. at *44. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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 Although it is unlikely there will be an official Court opinion in this case, the 
subject matter in the complaint’s allegations, as well as other forms of music 
streaming fraud, are worth examining from a legal perspective. There are multiple 
types of fraud in music streaming. There are different types of third parties that have 
manipulated the system to obtain financial gain by defrauding the music streaming 
services and diluting the rightsholder royalty pool.7 Third party playlist pluggers 
have been accused of using fraudulent practices to boost streams to generate higher 
royalty revenue for their clients.8 In the Focus Media case, Streamify was accused of 
obtaining streams for artist clients by deceptive practices like stream farms.9 Other 
third parties have committed music streaming fraud by creating fake artists, songs 
and playlists as a means to defraud digital music platforms and obtain royalty revenue 
at the expense of legitimate artists and rightsholders.10 Further, users have been 
accused of downloading bots to loop particular artists’ compositions manipulating 
the royalty pool toward a favored artist.11   
 There have also been allegations that music industry insiders, at both the artist 
and label levels, have committed music streaming fraud.12 Artist managers have been 
accused of using shady third-party playlist pluggers and bot farms to boost streams 
to generate greater revenue in favor of their clients.13 Record labels (“labels”) and 
artists have been accused of the same practice. 14 Artists have also been accused of 
requesting fans to download bots to stream songs on a loop to drive more royalty 
 
 7. Cherie Hu, Fraud Has Become the Latest Hurdle for Music Streaming, VARIETY (Aug. 16, 2018, 9:45 
AM), https://variety.com/2018/music/news/music-streaming-sites-fraud-1202905665/; Glenn Peoples, How 
‘Playola’ Is Infiltrating Streaming Services: Pay for Play Is ‘Definitely Happening’, BILLBOARD (Aug. 19, 
2015), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6670475/playola-promotion-streaming-services. 
 8. Peoples, supra note 7. 
 9. Focus, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205912 at *7-9.  Tim Ingham, Forget About Fake Artists – It’s Time to 
Talk About Fake Streams, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE  (Jul. 20, 2017), 
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/forget-about-fake-artists-its-time-to-talk-about-fake-streams/. 
 10. Wang, supra note 2. 
 11. Matt Clinch, How the Music Industry Is Fighting Online Fraud, CNBC (Dec. 28, 2015, 8:55 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/28/how-the-music-industry-is-fighting-online-fraud.html; Lisa Respers France, 
Fans Stream Nelly to Help Him Pay Off $2.4 Million Debt, CNN (Sept. 13, 2016, 2:47 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/13/media/nelly-debt-streaming/. 
 12. Peoples, supra note 7. 
 13. Tim Ingham, How the Music Business Can Actually Crack Down on Streaming Fraud: The Music 
Business Is Fighting Streaming Fraud with a Pointless New “Code.” It Won’t Work – but These Ideas Will, 
ROLLING STONE (Jun. 21, 2019, 12:04 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/how-to-fight-
spotify-streaming-fraud-850990/. 
 14. Roderick Thomas, Rolling Stone Charts – The End of Payola?, STAR REVUE (Oct. 1, 2019), 
http://www.star-revue.com/rolling-stone-charts-the-end-of-payola/#sthash.4MIbWjs0.dpbs. 
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income to a particular artist.15 When insiders within the industry manipulate streams 
(or have been accused of), the practice has been coined ‘playola.’16 
There have also been music streaming fraud allegations directly against the digital 
music platforms. Digital music services have been accused of diluting the royalty 
pool for their own benefit by creating their own songs and placing those songs on 
popular playlists.17 Other digital music platforms have been accused of manipulating 
streaming data in favor of certain artists.18   
Unfortunately, in many instances of music streaming fraud, the fraudulent 
practice may not be considered illegal. In fact, where fraud has been alleged against 
the digital music services or a music industry insider, the practice may fall into a 
legal grey area that is not necessarily in violation of any statute.19 However, these 
practices may substantially decrease royalty payouts to legitimate artists and 
rightsholders and, in turn, harm the consumer.20 This comment examines how music 
streaming fraud may be prevented in the future and attempts to present the best 
course of action that can be taken to protect the intellectual property rights of 
rightsholders from music streaming fraud.   
This comment addresses this problem in ten parts. The first section discusses the 
basics of how the must streaming playlist operates.21 The second section explains the 
music streaming royalty pool.22 The third,23 fourth24 and fifth25 sections discuss the 
different forms of accused fraud allegedly committed by third parties, music industry 
insiders, and the digital music services, respectively. The sixth section examines 
current music streaming fraud prevention methods and industry speculation of why 
little has been done to prevent music streaming fraud.26  The seventh section explores 
 
 15. Clinch, supra note 11. 
 16. Peoples, supra note 7; Glenn Peoples, Modern Promotion & Playlisting: Beyond the Playola, 
BILLBOARD (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6678562/modern-promotion-
playlists-handshakes. 
 17. See generally Tim Ingham, Spotify Is Making Its Own Records…and Putting Them on Playlists, MUSIC 
BUS. WORLDWIDE (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/spotify-is-creating-its-own-
recordings-and-putting-them-on-playlists/. 
 18. Murray Stassen, TIDAL Now Officially a Suspect in Norwegian Data Fraud Investigation, MUSIC BUS. 
WORLDWIDE, (Jun. 10, 2020), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/tidal-now-officially-a-suspect-in-
norwegian-data-fraud-
investigation/#:~:text=DN%20reported%20yesterday%20(June%209,since%20June%2021%20last%20year. 
 19. Peoples, supra note 16. 
 20. See Hu, supra note 7; Ingham, supra note 13. 
 21. See infra Section I. 
 22. See infra Section II. 
 23. See infra Section III. 
 24. See infra Section IV. 
 25. See infra Section V. 
 26. See infra Section VI. 
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why liability in the case of music streaming fraud is almost impossible to prove.27 
The eighth section discusses the current industry solutions.28 In the last sections, 
current legislation and possible solutions are examined and proposed.29   
I. WHY THE PLAYLIST IS IMPORTANT AND THE IMPACT OF FRAUD  
The music streaming playlist has become a prominent source of royalty revenue 
for rightsholders.30 The music streaming playlist is a powerful promotional tool in 
the music industry,31 as when a song is placed on a popular playlist, this placement 
can almost guarantee that the song will become a hit.32 There are multiple types of 
playlists including playlists curated by digital music platforms, playlists curated by 
labels and playlists curated by independent parties (both commercial entities and 
individuals).33 Top playlists can have millions of followers.34 These followers may 
use these playlists to listen to music during the entirety of the day or use popular 
playlists in conjunction with specific activities, like working out, relaxing,  and 
partying.35 Followers may also turn to playlists to listen to new music or music of a 
specific genre.36   
These playlists become especially important when a playlist has millions of 
followers.37 Spotify’s playlist entitled Today’s Top Hits has over 25 million 
followers and over 20 billion streams.38 Top playlists with millions of followers can 
 
 27. See infra Section VII. 
 28. See infra Section VIII. 
 29. See infra Section IX, X. 
 30. See Peoples, supra note 16. 
 31. Id.; See Peoples, supra note 7. 
 32. See David Pierce, The Secret Hit-Making Power of the Spotify Playlist, WIRED (May 3, 2017, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2017/05/secret-hit-making-power-spotify-playlist/. 
 33. Simon Owens, How Artists Illegally Pay Their Way onto Spotify’s Playlists, MEDIUM (May 7, 2018), 
https://medium.com/the-business-of-content/how-artists-illegally-pay-their-way-onto-spotifys-playlists-
6b85ce0865c5; Robert Cookson, Spotify Bans ‘Payola’ on Playlists, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 20, 2015), 
https://www.ft.com/content/af1728ca-4740-11e5-af2f-4d6e0e5eda22. 
 34. See Spotify’s Biggest Playlist, Today’s Top Hits, Celebrates 25 Million Followers, SPOTIFY (Dec. 16, 
2019) [hereinafter SPOTIFY], https://newsroom.spotify.com/2019-12-16/spotifys-biggest-playlist-todays-top-
hits-celebrates-25-million-followers/; Owens, supra note 33; Cookson, supra note 33. 
 35. See Pierce, supra note 32; Eric R. Danton, Streaming Success? How Some Artists Are Building Their 
Careers Through Spotify Playlists, FORTUNE (Dec. 12, 2019, 12:30 PM), 
https://fortune.com/2019/12/12/spotify-artists-success-streaming-playlists/. 
 36. SPOTIFY, supra note 34; See generally Glenn Peoples, Consumers Now Favor Streaming Services for 
Music Discovery over All Other Sources, BILLBOARD (Sept. 30, 2020), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/streaming/9457753/consumers-streaming-music-discovery-music-
360. 
 37. Owens, supra note 33. 
 38. SPOTIFY, supra note 34; Stuart Dredge, Spotify’s Today’s Top Hits Playlist Now Has 25 Million 
Followers, MUSICALLY (Dec. 17, 2019), https://musically.com/2019/12/17/spotifys-todays-top-hits-playlist-
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increase the number of streams, which in turn significantly increases royalty revenue 
for rightsholders.39 As millions of followers listen to their favorite playlists every 
day, the streams for the songs contained on that playlist continue to increase.40 
Currently, a third of all Spotify user listening time is spent listening to Spotify-
curated playlists and another third of this time is spent listening to user-created 
playlists.41 These listening habits give playlists incredible importance as new music 
or artists may never be discovered if their compositions cannot gain inclusion on 
these playlists.42 Some major labels have claimed an artist a failure because that 
artist, despite traditional terrestrial radio and tour success, was not “playlisted.”43   
Many curators, whether through human or artificial interaction, depend on general 
streaming numbers to determine whether songs are placed on some of the most 
popular music playlists.44 In other words, music with demonstrated popularity is 
selected for playlists, which then further increases its popularity. Companies, like 
Spotify, have been accused as being more data driven, even in human selections, than 
musically driven45 and have become increasing reliant on algorithms to make, or 
dwindle, musical selections down for later human selection.46 In contrast, other 
digital platforms, like Apple Music, claim that playlists are, first, hand-selected by a 




 39. Jacob Passy, How Spotify Influences What Songs Become Popular (or Not), MARKETWATCH (Jun. 18, 
2018, 2:38 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-spotify-influences-what-songs-become-popular-or-
not-2018-06-18?ns=prod/accounts-mw. 
 40. Id.; Mansoor Iqbal, Spotify Usage and Revenue Statistics (2020), BUSINESSOFAPPS (Oct. 30, 2020), 
https://www.businessofapps.com/data/spotify-statistics/. 
 41. Iqbal, supra note 40. 
 42. See Passy, supra note 39. 
 43. Nosheen Iqbal, Forget the DJs: Spotify Playlists Are the New Musical Starmakers, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 
28, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2019/apr/28/streaming-music-algorithms-spotify. 
 44. Andy Gensler & Ed Christman, How Spotify’s ‘Fake Artist’ Controversy Has Increased Tensions with 
Label Partners, Could Hurt Its Bottom Line, BILLBOARD (Jul. 19, 2017), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7872889/spotify-fake-artist-playlist-controversy-record-label-
tensions-ipo; Owens, supra note 33. 
 45. Marc Hogan, Up Next: How Playlists Are Curating the Future of Music, PITCHFORK (Jul. 16, 2018), 
https://pitchfork.com/features/article/9686-up-next-how-playlists-are-curating-the-future-of-music/; Ben 
Popper, How Spotify’s Discover Weekly Cracked Human Curation at Internet Scale, THE VERGE (Jul. 16, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2015/9/30/9416579/spotify-discover-weekly-online-music-curation-interview; 
Pierce, supra note 32; Cherie Hu, Why Spotify Thinks Its ‘Self Driving Music’ Strategy Will Benefit Creators, 
BILLBOARD (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8249695/why-spotify-thinks-self-
driving-music-strategy-will-benefit-creators; Owens, supra note 33. 
 46. Hogan, supra note 45. 
 47. Id.; See generally The Art (and Science) of Music Playlists, HEWLETT PACKARD (Nov. 11, 2018) 
[hereinafter Hewlett Packard], https://store.hp.com/us/en/tech-takes/the-art-of-music-playlists. 
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playlist after that initial hand selection.48 Here, the artificial intervention only occurs 
when the playlist is distributed to the consumer, but not in the actual creation of that 
playlist.49  
In both of these situations, instances of music streaming fraud can significantly 
impact the chances of commercial success for legitimate artists.50 In cases of playola, 
industry insiders may tip the playlist scales in favor of represented artists while 
sacrificing the chances of independent artists or even upcoming or new artists.51 In 
cases of music streaming fraud, a song that received fraudulent streams may be 
placed on a music streaming playlist, appropriating commercial and financial success 
that belonged to a legitimate artist.52   
 Additionally, playlist promotion has become a very important part of the 
current music industry framework.53 Music streaming now accounts for about eighty 
percent of the total revenue generated by recorded music.54 Labels have included 
playlist promotion in their marketing plans and budgets.55 A song placed on the right 
playlist can lead to greater opportunities for that song, such as placements in film, 
television and commercials.56 A song’s streams spike after that song is added to a 
popular playlist.57 Once a song is added to that popular playlist, listeners will then 
add that song to their own playlists.58 Increased streams increase chart position.59  
Radio stations now use streaming data to make radio programming choices.60 
Needless to say, the playlist has gained all of the power of making or breaking an 
artist’s single.61   
 
 48. Hogan, supra note 45; see generally Hewlett Packard, supra note 47. 
 49. Hogan, supra note 45; see generally Hewlett Packard, supra note 47. 
 50. Owens, supra note 33. 
 51. See generally Peoples, supra note 7; Owens, supra note 33. 
 52. See Ingham, supra note 9; Gensler & Christman, supra note 44; Owens, supra note 33. 
 53. Peoples, supra note 7; See Ingham, supra note 9; See generally Peoples, supra note 16. 
 54. Rob Arcand, Streaming Now Accounts for 80 Percent of the Music Industry’s Overall Revenue, SPIN 
(Sept. 6, 2019, 12:49 PM), https://www.spin.com/2019/09/music-streaming-80-percent-of-music-industry-
overall-revenue/. 
 55. Peoples, supra note 7; see generally Peoples, supra note 16. 
 56. Peoples, supra note 7. 
 57. Id.; Peoples, supra note 16. 
 58. Peoples, supra note 16. 
 59. Leight, supra note 1; Noah Yoo, How Artist Imposters and Fake Songs Sneak onto Streaming Services: 
When Songs Leak on Spotify and Apple Music, Illegal Uploads Can Generate Substantial Royalty Payments – 
But for Whom?, PITCHFORK (Aug. 21, 2019), https://pitchfork.com/features/article/how-artist-imposters-and-
fake-songs-sneak-onto-streaming-services/; Cookson, supra note 33; Owens, supra note 33; See Adam K. 
Raymond, The Streaming Problem: How Spammers, Superstars and Tech Giants Gamed the Music Industry, 
VULTURE (Jul. 5, 2017), https://www.vulture.com/2017/07/streaming-music-cheat-codes.html. 
 60. Peoples, supra note 7. 
 61. Id.; Owens, supra note 33. 
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II. THE ROYALTY POOL 
Before analyzing the implications of fraud on the royalty pool, the royalty pool 
must be explained more generally. There are two different royalty rates that pertain 
to the royalty pool and require calculation: rates that apply to labels and artists, and 
rates that apply to music publishers and songwriters.62 
The pro-rated percentage allocated to the labels and artists are freely negotiated 
between the streaming service and labels at a percentage of subscriber fees.63 
Unfortunately, because these agreements are confidential the details of any current 
agreements are not publicly available.64   
The pro-rated percentage for music publishers and songwriters is determined by 
statute.65 The standard royalty rate to be paid by digital music services to music 
publishers and songwriters is 10.5% of revenue, less the amount of license fees paid 
for the public performance per subscriber (“Payable Royalty Pool”).66 Fees paid for 
public performances are those fees paid to the public performance societies like the 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast 
Music, Inc. (BMI), and the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers 
(SESAC). 67 However, the 10.5% rate may not apply to all digital music services.68 
 The All-In Royalty Pool69 has multiple components for payments made to 
music publishers and songwriters and is established as statute by the Copyright 
 
 62. See generally U.S. Music Streaming Royalties Explained, MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP n.3, 
[hereinafter Manatt] https://www.manatt.com/Manatt/media/Media/PDF/US-Streaming-Royalties-
Explained.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2020). 
 63. BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 847 (5th ed. 2019). 
 64. Although current agreements are confidential, in 2015, the details of an agreement between Sony and 
Spotify.  The agreement is no longer valid, but provided Sony a $42.5 million in advance payments, $9 million 
in advertising credits, a complex formula for royalty payments each year, and a most favored nation’s clause that 
requires that Spotify pay Sony any higher rate that another label may negotiate.  With these contract details, it is 
impossible to know how much of these monies were received by the artist and this agreement applied only to 
labels and represented artists.  The contract did not include music publishers and songwriters.  The contract was 
once displayed online but has since been taken down out of respect for Sony. Further, without additional contract 
details, it is impossible to know what other clauses may have affected monetary distributions.  See Micah 
Singleton, This Was Sony’s Music Contract with Spotify, THE VERGE (May 19, 2015, 10:05 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2015/5/19/8621581/sony-music-spotify-contract; see generally Ben Sisario, Sony 
Terms Uncovered in Contract, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/25/business/media/sony-terms-with-spotify-uncovered-in-contract.html. 
 65. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 385 (2019); 84 FR § 1918 (2019). 
 66. Kohn, supra note 63, at 845. 
 67. Id. at 1217. 
 68. Manatt, supra note 62; see also Kohn, supra note 63, at 846-850. 
 69. 37 C.F.R. § 385 (2019); 84 FR § 1918 (2019). In the “first step of the calculation, the parties determine 
the All-In royalty pool; that is, the royalty that would be payable based on a formula balancing the greater of a 
percent-of-service revenue and a percentage of one of two other expense measures. One expense measure if a 
percent-of-royalties services pay to record companies for sound recording performance rights, differing 
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Royalty Board.70 Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLC describes these allocations as 
follows:  
“There is a ‘Minimum All-In Royalty Pool’ calculated as a percentage of 
the amount the service reports to pay labels (the “label payment”), which 
applies if the result is greater than 10.5% of service revenue. That 
percentage changes depending on whether the record label or the service 
obtains the mechanical license. In practice, it is always the service, which 
means the All-In Royalty Pool is calculated as 21% of the label payment. 
If the licensee were ever the label, the All-In Royalty Pool will be 17.36% 
of the label payment. There is also a ‘Subscriber-Based Floor’ of 80¢ per 
subscriber per month, which will be used only if it results in a smaller 
amount than the Minimum All-In Royalty Pool. There is an additional 
mechanical Subscriber[-]Based Floor of 50¢ per subscriber per month 
that applies if the Payable Royalty Pool is smaller after deducting 
performance monies (which it almost certainly is for Spotify). Note that 
for ad-supported interactive services, there are no Subscriber-Based 
Floors and there are different percentages for the Minimum All-In 
Royalty Pool. Practically, this means the All-In Royalty Pool for Spotify’s 
ad-supported service is the greater of (i) 10.5% of service revenue and 
(ii) 22% of the label payment.”71   
 
However, for purposes of this paper, and to give a simpler presentation of the 
complexities of the statute, the easiest calculation method to conceptualize the 
general equation for the royalty pool for any given royalty period is:72 
 
depending upon whether the sound recording licenses are pass-through or not pass-through. For certain 
subscription services, the percent-of service revenue is balanced against the lesser of two or three other potential 
mathematical outcomes.  The second calculation reduces the All-In royalty pool to the “payable” royalty pool in 
a two-step process. First the parties subtract royalties the services pay for musical works performance rights from 
the All-In royalty established in the first calculation. This remainder is considered the payable royalty pool for 
certain service offerings; viz., non-subscription, ad-supported, purchased content lockers, mixed service bundles, 
and music bundles. For subscription service offerings, whether standalone or bundled, and depending upon 
whether the offering is portable or non-portable, streaming only or mixed use, determining the payable royalty 
pool requires a balancing of the mechanical remainder against a set rate for “qualified” subscribers per month to 
determine the greater-of result. The set rate for qualified subscribers differs for each variation of subscription 
offering.  The final step in the rate determination for each service offering is an allocation among licensors based 
upon the number of plays from each licensor’s catalog.” 
 70. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 385 (2019); 84 FR § 1918 (2019). 
 71. Manatt, supra note 62; see generally Kohn, supra note 63, at 846-850. 
 72. This is a conceptualized formula and does not include all the nuances of the equation, or provide the 
different calculations as required by 37 C.F.R § 385 based on service offering.  This is for conceptualization 
purposes only.  See generally 37 C.F.R. § 385 (2019); 84 FR § 1918 (2019). 
Smith-Burton (Do Not Delete) 8/10/2021  10:03 PM 
CHRISTINE SMITH BURTON 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 395 
 
(Net Revenue) x (Total number of streams of a track) 73 
__________________________________________________ 
 
(Total number of streams) 
 
The net revenue is determined by the revenue obtained by monthly subscriber fees 
minus overhead costs. This calculation is calculated monthly.74   
This net revenue is then divided into three categories: the digital platform, the 
rightsholders of the sound recordings, and the rightsholders of the composition.75 In 
using Spotify as an example, Spotify retains 30% of the revenue, the rightsholders of 
the sound recordings receive 55-60% and the rightsholders of the compositions 
receive 10-15% of this revenue.76 When the royalty allocation is broken down to a 
per stream variable, the estimated calculated rate is approximately $0.004 per 
stream.77   
This royalty structure favors higher market share rightsholders.78 When a 
particular rightsholder controls a greater market share within a given royalty pool, 
that rightsholder will receive a greater share of that royalty allocation decreasing the 
allocations for smaller market share rightsholders.79   
III. THIRD PARTY FRAUD 
There are many different types of third-party music streaming fraud in the current 
music streaming market. Third parties may include third party promotional 
companies, called playlist pluggers, which are hired by an artist or label.80 A third 
party may also include a user that commits fraud by manipulating the royalty pool to 
 
 73. Chris Castle, Arithmetic on the Internet: The Ethical Pool Solution to Streaming Royalty Allocation, 
MUSIC TECH SOLUTIONS (Oct. 2, 2018), https://musictech.solutions/2018/10/02/arithmetic-on-the-internet-the-
ethical-pool-solution-to-streaming-royalty-allocation/. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Chris Cooke, Dissecting the Digital Dollar, Part Two: Full Report 30, MUSIC MANAGERS FORUM 
(2016), https://themmf.net/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/MMF_DDD-Part-Two_Full-Report_Web.pdf.pdf. 
 76. Id. 
 77. This is an approximate value and not a fixed rate.  The rate varies monthly based on individual service 
calculations and services do not pay the same rates.  See generally 2019-2020 Streaming Price Bible: YouTube 
Is STILL the #1 Problem to Solve, THE TRICHORDIST (Mar. 5, 2020), https://thetrichordist.com/category/royalty-
rates-2/.  See also Hu, supra note 7. 
 78. Castle, supra note 73. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Kodi Vonn, How to Get on a Spotify Playlist (and How Not To): Playlist Promotion Companies Are on 
the Rise. But Are They Worth It?, MEDIUM (Dec. 18, 2017), https://medium.com/bandbasher/playlist-plugging-
companies-scam-savior-or-superfluous-a43ad36a763. 
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obtain financial gain.81 In other instances, a third party may be a fan of an artist that 
believes that they are helping their artist gain greater revenue and success by 
manipulating the streaming system.82 
A. Third-Party Playlist Pluggers 
Third party playlist pluggers are companies that an artist, artist manager, and/or 
label may hire for playlist promotion. This promotion is important as these 
promotional efforts may allow for an artist’s compositions to gain access to 
successful playlists created by companies like Spotify and Apple Music.83 In some 
cases, these third-party services are legitimate and create sophisticated promotional 
and marketing campaigns in order to promote a song to a particular fan base.84 
Through that outreach, a song will reach success with listeners, and through that 
success gain a highly-competitive placement on a digital music platform playlist.85 
However, there are other third-party playlist pluggers that have promised artists the 
same type of services as offered by legitimate services, but actually use fraudulent 
practices to falsely develop success for a particular artist or song.86   
These fraudulent third party playlist pluggers create fake streams – that is, 
automated streams that do not actually represent a real listener - on digital music 
service platforms like Spotify.87 These fake streams not only increase the artist’s pro-
rated royalty share, but also obtain enough success to land on a playlist.88 Companies, 
like Streamify,89 offer this service on their website and even offer a warning that an 
artist should not buy too many streams for a particular song as significant stream 
increases for a particular composition may be labeled fraudulent by the digital music 
streaming platforms.90 Streamify suggests buying increments of streams.91 However, 
even though these practices may seem obviously fraudulent, many artists believe that 
they are simply purchasing a marketing campaign for their composition.92 The artist 
 
 81. Ingham, supra note 13. 
 82. See generally Respers France, supra note 11; Wang, supra note 2. 
 83. See generally Peoples, supra note 16; Vonn, supra note 80. 
 84. Peoples, supra note 16. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Vonn, supra note 80. 
 87. Fraudsters will buy streams for a client or give an artist the opportunity to purchase streams. Vonn, supra 
note 80; Ingham, supra note 9. 
 88. Vonn, supra note 80; Hu, supra note 7. 
 89. Streamify is a third-party playlist plugger that allows customers to purchase streams on Spotify. See 
Ingham, supra note 9. 
 90. Ingham, supra note 9. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See generally Hu, supra note 7. 
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does not always realize that companies like Streamify are actually using stream farms 
or bot programs to falsely generate those streams.93   
 This false manipulation of streams violates most digital music platforms’ terms 
and conditions of service.94 When a digital music platform, like Spotify, identifies 
such fraud, the artist may be permanently removed from the service, at the service’s 
discretion.95 And, as previously mentioned in this section, the artist may not be aware 
of the fraudulent practices committed by the third party plugger.96 For instance, when 
the musician Ari Herstand used the Streamify placement service, he was later 
removed from Spotify for fraudulent streams accumulated under his Streamify 
contract.97 Unfortunately for artists like Herstand, the artists’ lack of knowledge of a 
contracted third party placement plugger’s fraudulent practices does not prevent the 
artist from being removed from a digital music platform.98 The artist, as the 
contracting party with the digital music service, is the person that is responsible for 
the contractual obligations contained in a digital music service’s terms and 
conditions.99 There are multiple third party placement services that have been 
accused of these practices. Although the Focus case is the first complaint filed, there 
have been accusations against companies in addition to Streamify, like Spotlister, 
StreamKO, Fiverr, and many others.100   
B. Fake Artists, Songs, and Playlists  
A popular practice for stream manipulation is for an end user to create fake artists, 
fake songs, fake playlists, and fake user accounts to manipulate royalty pools to 
falsely generate royalty income.101 In 2017, a Bulgarian scammer allegedly created 
a fake artist account on Spotify and uploaded 467 digitally auto-generated tracks.102 
 
 93. See generally Vonn, supra note 80. 
 94. APPLE, INC., APPLE MEDIA TERMS AND CONDITIONS (2019), https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-
services/itunes/us/terms.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2019) (explaining that you may not use the Services to plan 
or engage in any illegal, fraudulent, or manipulative activity); Peoples, supra note 7 (explaining that Spotify’s 
head of communications announced “new terms of service… which prohibit selling accounts and playlists or 
“accepting any compensation, financial or otherwise, to influence…the content included on an account or 
playlist); Raymond, supra note 59; Yoo, supra note 59. 
 95. Vonn, supra note 80. 
 96. Hu, supra note 7. 
 97. Vonn, supra note 80. 
 98. Id.; Hu, supra note 7. 
 99. Vonn, supra note 80; Hu, supra note 7. 
 100. Vonn, supra note 80; Hu, supra note 7.; Ingham, supra note 9. 
 101. See generally Tim Ingham, The Great Big Spotify Scan: Did a Bulgarian Playlister Swindle Their Way 
to a Fortune on Streaming Service?, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/great-big-spotify-scam-bulgarian-playlister-swindle-way-fortune-
streaming-service/. 
 102. Id. 
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Each of the tracks were a little over 30 seconds in length and all 467 tracks were 
placed across two fake playlists entitled “Soulful Music” and “Music From the 
Heart.”103 After creating these artists and playlists, the scammer allegedly then 
opened 1200 individual fake accounts on the Spotify Premium platform.104 Each 
account was set to listen to the fake playlists on continual 30 second loops.105 This 
false manipulation led the scammer to earn royalty income of over $400,000 per 
month.106 These fraudulent playlists became so successful based on these forced 
loops that the “Soulful Music” playlist ranked No. 11 and “Music from the Heart” 
playlist ranked No. 22 on Spotify’s top revenue playlists in the United States.107 The 
scam was discovered by a label executive who received internal Spotify chart lists 
and notified Spotify.108 Spotify removed the playlists, but  only after the scammer 
generated over a speculated $1 million dollars in royalty pool revenue.109   
This “click-fraud”110 type of music streaming fraud has become rather 
commonplace within digital music streaming platforms. Along with the scammer 
above, there are also bots that masquerade as fake artists and create fake tracks, often 
mimicking songs from established artists.111 The bots then repeatedly play the 
streams and generate revenue each time the song loops.112 The bots will use multiple 
accounts to avoid detection.113 Spotify has developed and uses an algorithm to detect 
various factors considered to be artificial listening habits.114 Such artificial listening 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Ingham, supra note 101. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Click Fraud, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/click-fraud.asp (last visited Nov. 
24, 2020).  Click fraud is similar to music streaming fraud as multiple clicks effects the overall outcome of the 
product.  In advertising, click fraud is used to decrease the value of an ad.  In music streaming fraud, click fraud 
is used to generate royalty income which, in turn, decreases the royalty revenue for legitimate streams.  See 
Bishop Cheen, Streaming Music Is Also a Victim of Click Fraud, S&P GLOBAL: MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 
18, 2016, 1:09 PM), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-
insights/trending/8ltyrme8rsavsydv74sehw2. 
 111. Clinch, supra note 11. 
 112. Id.; see generally William Bedell, I Built a Botnet That Could Destroy Spotify with Fake Listens: 
Automated Streaming Is the Next Frontier of Click Fraud, VICE (Oct. 16, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gv5xbx/i-built-a-botnet-that-could-destroy-spotify-with-fake-listens 
(explaining how, in 2013, Peter Fillmore was among the first to demonstrate the automated programs could 
generate massive royalties by having software-based robots to listen to music non-stop. Fillmore’s account 
existed for 6 months, but Spotify took the account down.  Also, the author mentions how he built a bot to exploit 
the music service and accumulate royalties from fake streams). 
 113. Clinch, supra note 11; Bedell, supra note 112. 
 114. Clinch, supra note 11; Bedell, supra note 112. 
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habits can include excessive streaming by a small numbers of users may trigger 
Spotify’s anti-fraud algorithm.115 Any account detected as an artificial listening habit 
is then removed by Spotify.116 Some fraudsters have infiltrated artists’ page with 
auto-generated songs to gain greater illegal gains by hoping the consumer will be 
tricked into listening to the fake track.117 The consumer may listen to the fake track 
believing it to be a new track released by the artist.118 Other scams have included 
fraudsters releasing previous unreleased songs, and sometimes released tracks under 
similar titles, by famous musicians under a fake artist name.119   
C. Bots 
Although bots were mentioned in the previous section, there are different ways in 
which a bot can be used to manipulate music streams.120 A bot is “a software program 
that operates on the Internet and performs repetitive tasks.”121 A bot is automated and 
runs according to programmed human instruction.122 These bots operate amongst 
many industries, but in the music industry a person programs the software to 
repetitively stream a track, or tracks, of either legitimate songs by actual artists or 
fake auto-generated tracks.123 In some cases, bots are merely individuals that register 
accounts and play tracks for about 35 seconds repeatedly.124 Sophisticated bots are 
computer programs that are designed to click on certain links at certain times.125 Bots 
can be incorporated into click-farm environments to falsely boost streams.126 Peter 
Fillmore, a security consultant in Melbourne Australia, used a sophisticated bot on a 
 
 115. Clinch, supra note 11; Bedell, supra note 112. 
 116. Clinch, supra note 11; Bedell, supra note 112. 
 117. See generally Rob Arcand, El-P Calls Out Spotify for Not Protecting Artists Against Fraud, SPIN (Oct. 
20, 2018), https://www.spin.com/2018/10/el-p-calls-out-spotify-for-not-protecting-artists-against-fraud/; Yoo, 
supra note 59. 
 118. Raymond, supra note 59; see generally Arcand, supra note 117; Yoo, supra note 59. 
 119. Raymond, supra note 59; see generally Arcand, supra note 117; Yoo, supra note 59. 
 120. Vonn, supra note 80. 
 121. What Is a Bot?, CLOUDFARE, https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/bots/what-is-a-bot/ (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2020); See generally Paris Martineau, What Is a Bot?, WIRED (Nov. 16, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/the-know-it-alls-what-is-a-bot/. 
 122. What Is a Bot?  Definitions and Examples, MARKET BUS. NEWS, 
https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/bot-
definition/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CA%20bot%20is%20a%20software,replace%20a%20human%20user’s%20be
havior.%E2%80%9D (last visited Nov. 23, 2020). 
 123. Tim Ingham, The Music Industry Is Tackling Streaming Fraud with a Pointless ‘Code.’  It Won’t Work 
. . . but These Ideas Might, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE  (Jun. 23, 2019), 
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/the-music-industry-is-tackling-streaming-fraud-with-a-pointless-
code-it-wont-work-but-these-ideas-might/. 
 124. Vonn, supra note 80. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.; Clinch, supra note 11. 
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now defunct platform, Rdio, to automate fake streams, and avoided detection for 6 
months.127 William Bedell128 created his own sophisticated bot program to automate 
fake streams on Spotify in 2015.129 Bedell predicts, based on his experiment of fraud 
on Spotify, that if a sophisticated computer-programed bot could mimic consumer 
listening behavior well enough, the bot could be completely undetectable by the 
digital music services current anti-fraud algorithms.130 Considering the ongoing use 
of bots to generate streams and the length of times it takes for digital music platforms 
to detect this type of fraud, Spotify, and any other affected digital music platform, 
have not implemented enough policing measures to combat illegitimate parties from 
accumulating fraudulent royalty payouts. 131 
IV. INSIDER FRAUD: A NEW FORM OF PAYOLA 
Music streaming fraud perpetrated by industry insiders has been labeled 
playola.132 The term is a play-on the previously coined term payola.133 Payola occurs 
when a person pays a DJ or radio programmer for a song placement on a radio 
broadcast playlist.134 Playola similarly occurs when a person pays or influences a 
playlist curator for a song’s placement on a particular playlist.135 Before proceeding 
with insider manipulation of a music streaming playlist, it is important to address 
payola and how the manipulation of radio playlists are strikingly similar to the 
current speculated manipulation of the playlists on digital music platforms. 
 
 127. See generally Bedell, supra note 112. 
 128. William Bedell is a computer engineer and journalist that wrote a step-by-step tutorial on how to set-up 
a click fraud scheme using bots.  See Wang, supra note 2. 
 129. See generally Bedell, supra note 112. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.; Hu, supra note 7; Wang, supra note 2. 
 132. See generally Peoples, supra note 7. 
 133. R.H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 269 (1979) (explaining 
“[t]he term “payola” is generally said to have been introduced by the trade periodical Variety and its popularity 
resulted from its use in that periodical”). 
 134. Id. at 269 (“In Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, payola is defined as “an undercover or 
indirect payment for a commercial favor (as to a disc jockey for plugging a song.”).  Payola, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/payola. (showing that Merriam-Webster continues to apply the 
same payola definition) (last visited Dec. 31, 2019). 
 135. Peoples, supra note 7. 
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A. Payola 
1. The History of Payola 
 Payola has been documented in the music industry as early as the 1800s.136 
Payola began when songwriters started to pay leading performance artists and 
orchestra band leaders to perform their material to gain further performances.137 
Unfortunately, these payments eventually led to harassment and extortion of the paid 
performing artists. 138 This pay-to-play mentality continued into the vaudeville 
industry,139 and then into radio broadcasting.140 By the time radio broadcasting 
became popular, record companies had emerged and represented an artist’s releases. 
Radio disc jockeys became superstars, as their selections of songs could make or 
break an artist.141 When disc jockeys started to realize the power they had in an 
artist’s career, many began to demand payment from record companies to play new 
material.142 Payments included cash, expensive gifts, homes, airplane tickets, drugs, 
prostitutes or whatever else the disc jockey demanded.143 Some disc jockeys required 
a portion of record royalties or a portion of copyright ownership in a composition 
and would open their own publishing companies and talent agencies to account for 
those royalties.144 Some disc jockeys would demand a substantial number of records 
in exchange for plays, and would then open their own record stores to sell the free 
records they required as payment.145 Disc jockeys began to refuse to play any new 
material without some form of payment to do so.146 Any record company or music 
publisher that refused to make such a payment was blacklisted across the radio 
industry.147   
 
 136. See generally KERRY SEAGRAVE, PAYOLA IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: A HISTORY, 1880-1991, 1-7 
(1994). 
 137. See generally id. 
 138. See generally id. 
 139. Id.at 8-29. 
 140. Id. at 30-50. 
 141. Seagraves, supra note 136 at 74-75. 
 142. Id. at 75. 
 143. Id. at 80, 98. 
 144. Id. at 80-83. 
 145. Id. at 81. 
 146. Id. at 80-81. 
 147. Seagraves, supra note 136 at 80. 
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 In 1938, Variety148 began reporting on pay-for-play in the radio industry, 
coining the term “payola” to describe the activity.149 Billboard150 followed and began 
reporting pay-for-play.151 Additionally, at this time, a small record company that 
could not afford the payola payments filed a complaint with the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”).152   
2. Payola and Federal Government Interventions  
 Throughout the late 1950s multiple government investigations occurred, 
including an investigation launched by the House Special Committee on Legislative 
Oversight, to investigate payola.153 In 1957, a senator proposed an amendment to the 
Communications Act that would force broadcasters to divest themselves of 
conflicting interests created through payola schemes.154 The FCC threatened to 
terminate radio broadcasting licenses from any radio stations that participated in 
payola practices.155 
 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) also began an investigation based on 
complaints of unfair methods in competition in interstate commerce. The FTC 
investigation was initiated because payola had the ability to suppress competition 
and to unfairly divert business from competitors in violation of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.156 Three record manufacturers and six independent record 
distributors were accused.157 However, the FTC’s powers were limited to cease and 
desist orders, but their continued findings of violations led to the Department of 
Justice’s (“DOJ”) intervention.158 
 After public Congressional hearings in 1960, a new amendment to the 
Communications Act was passed.159 The Amendment stated that payola was 
 
 148. Variety is a magazine and internet news source that specializes in the entertainment business.  About Us, 
VARIETY, https://variety.com/variety-about-us/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2020); see also Variety (magazine), 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Variety_(magazine) (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
 149. Seagraves, supra note 136 at 1, 52-100. 
 150. Billboard is an entertainment trade magazine that specializes in music, video, and home entertainment.  
Billboard (magazine), WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billboard_(magazine)#:~:text=Billboard%20publishes%20a%20news%20website
,music%2C%20video%20and%20home%20entertainment.&text=The%20charts%20track%20music%20sales,s
ongs%20was%20introduced%20in%201958 (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
 151. Seagraves, supra note 136 at 75, 80-81. 
 152. Id. at 75. 
 153. Id. at 100. 
 154. Id. at 94. 
 155. Id. at 101. 
 156. Seagraves, supra note 136 at 111, 116-124. 
 157. Id. at 116. 
 158. Id. at 156. 
 159. Id. at 94-123. 
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acceptable only when “sponsorship” was announced to the listening audience.160 
Prosecutions for any violations would be handled by the DOJ and the FCC would 
handle any administrative penalties and license revocations.161 
 However, this new law did not stop the practice of payola.162 Payola went 
underground, which in turn made it harder to prove.163 Record companies and disc 
jockeys began to use independent promoters,164 and thus payola fees were hidden in 
advertising and promotion budgets.165 Rumors began that the mafia had become 
involved in the practice and would threaten violence on anyone that would not 
participate.166 The FCC attempted to conduct additional hearings, but could not find 
evidence to conduct a formal investigation.167 Informal industry complaints 
continued, but no one from the music industry would come forward for fear of being 
blacklisted.168   
 In 1986, NBC televised a two part series claiming that independent promoters 
had strong connections with organized crime.169 NBC’s report claimed that organized 
crime was now controlling payola.170 The Recording Industry Association of 
America ( “RIAA”) released a statement that denied all allegations from the NBC 
report.171 At this time, a New York federal grand jury investigating payola issued a 
sweeping subpoena to the RIAA that demanded all RIAA documentation pertaining 
to record company relations with industry promoters.172 The FCC refused to 
investigate because past experience had failed to turn up any relevant evidence.173 
Congress tried to initiate investigations, but no one within the industry was willing 
to testify.174 Another NBC report was televised.175 The RIAA had begun an internal 
 
 160. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1960); see generally 47 U.S.C. § 508 (1960). 
 161. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1960); see generally 47 U.S.C. § 508 (1960). 
 162. See generally Seagraves, supra note 136, at 159-214. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 95. 
 165. Id. at 195-221. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Seagraves, supra note 136, at 195-221. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 196-197. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 197. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Seagraves, supra note 136, at 200. 
 174. Id. at 203.  The industry’s unwillingness to testify may have been due to a fear of being blacklisted from 
radio. See note 169. 
 175. Id. at 205. 
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investigation, but the investigation was squashed.176 Although investigations and 
probes began across the United States, all indictments were eventually dropped.177  
 In the 2000s, the New York Attorney General’s office led another investigation 
into major labels’ and radio stations’ payola practices.178 The investigation turned up 
enough illegal payola evidence to force the major labels179 and several prominent 
radio chains to pay million-dollar settlements and agree to change their practices 
(“2005 Settlements”).180  
Payola, although still in existence, remained untested until September of 2019 
when the FCC issued a letter to the RIAA that demanded the RIAA investigate 
current payola practices in the industry.181   
B. Playola 
As the Internet has leveled many power blocks of the old music business, 
playlists have become valuable currency in streaming’s new world order, 
so much so that record companies now actively promote – and sometimes 
pay for – their songs to appear on such services as Spotify, Deezer, and 
Apple Music.   
 -Glenn Peoples, Billboard182 
 Just as the selection by a radio DJ could make or break a song in the twentieth 
century, the selection for a streaming playlist is the key to success today - as was the 
case with payola, where there is power, there is “pay-for-play.”183 Major label 
marketing executives have stated that “popular playlists can and have been 
bought”184 and this is considered part of the playola practice.185 According to a 2015 
 
 176. Id. at 206. 
 177. Id. at 195-221. 
 178. Elias Leight, Want to Get on the Radio?  Have 50,000?: 15 Years Ago, New York’s Attorney General 
Investigated Pay-For-Play in the Radio Industry.  Insiders Say the Practice Lives on – in a More Sophisticated 
Form, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 6, 2019, 1:09 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/radio-
stations-hit-pay-for-play-867825/ (explaining that the New York Attorney General’s office found that “money 
and other “valuable considerations” moved among labels or middlemen known as “indie promoters” and radio 
stations.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See generally Elias Leight, FCC Commissioner Asks RIAA to Investigate Payola Allegations: 
Commissioner Mike O’Reilly Sends Letter “to Determine Whether the Law Is Being Followed or Whether Any 
Problematic Conduct Must Be Addressed, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 5, 2019, 2:13 PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/payola-radio-fcc-riaa-letter-880304/. 
 182. Peoples, supra note 7. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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Billboard article, the price of playlist “pay-for-play” can range from $2,000 to 
$10,000 depending on the fan size of an individual playlist.186 Unlike payola, playola 
is not illegal.187 Currently, playola is not illegal because the Communications 
Amendment that covered payola is strictly limited to radio broadcasts and does not 
apply to digital streaming.188 However, some companies, like Spotify, include in their 
terms of service a prohibition of selling accounts or playlists or “accepting any 
compensation, financial or otherwise, to influence . . . the content included on an 
account or playlist.”189 However, playola may fall outside of these prohibitions 
because most labels refer to these payments as consultancy fees.190 Some companies 
believe that because they pay small consultancy fees to independent promoters to 
only ensure that the playlist curator hears the song, it cannot be proven that the 
curator is influenced by the payment.191 Some playlist curators are paid $100-150 to 
hear and consider a song.192 Many within the industry fear that placements on 
playlists, as was the case with payola, are quickly becoming available only to labels 
and artists with big pockets.193  
 In addition to the payment of fees to playlist curators, labels, artist managers 
and artists have also been accused of hiring third-party playlist pluggers to 
manipulate stream boosts.194 Although fraudulent third-party plugging is also 
performed by industry outsiders as described in supra Section III,195 when industry 
insiders, like labels and artists, engage in the same tactics it is a form of industry 
playola.196 Y-Kollektiv197 interviewed an unidentified streaming fraudster that 
claimed his services were being used by some of the biggest artists in the market.198 
The fraudster claimed to generate over € 100,000 a month because of the fraudster’s 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. 47 U.S.C. § 317. 
 189. Peoples, supra note 7. 
 190. Peoples, supra note 16. 
 191. Peoples, supra note 7. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.; Owens, supra note 33. 
 194. Ingham, supra note 13; Peoples, supra note 7; Anna Nicolaou, Music Industry Targets Troll Farms 
Distorting Streaming Revenues, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jun. 20, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/371b7b96-
92e1-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271; See generally Ingham, supra note 9; See Vonn, supra note 80. 
 195. See supra Section III. 
 196. See generally Peoples, supra note 16; Peoples, supra note 7. 
 197. Y-Kollektiv is a German YouTube channel that transmits video documentaries and is operated by the 
public service. Y-Kollektiv, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=de&u=https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Y-Kollektiv&prev=search 
(Last visited Dec. 31, 2019). 
 198. Ingham, supra note 13; Y-Kollektiv, Der Rap Hack: Kauf Dich in die Charts! Wie Klickzahlen 
manipuliert warden, YOUTUBE (May 23, 2019) [hereinafter Y-Kollektiv], 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qiqYuSQwkHo. 
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ability to operate or gain access to 150,000-250,000 streaming accounts.199 Most of 
his clients are said to be artist managers, but also include labels and artists as well.200 
The actions of major artists, artist managers, and labels using third parties, stream 
farms or other bot type activity, if true, not only boost artist streams, but also gives 
major artists a greater market share.201 An artificially increased market share 
provides these artists and labels more royalty income to the detriment of newer and/or 
independent artists and labels.202   
 In addition, major labels have purchased major influential playlists to guarantee 
placements.203 All of the major labels now own some of Spotify’s most popular and 
largest playlists: Universal Music Group owns Digster, Sony Music Group owns 
Filtr, and Warner Music Group owns Topsify.204   
 Artists have also been accused of requesting that fans help manipulate streams 
in that artist’s favor.205 In 2015, the band Vulfpeck asked fans to stream their new 
album to boost revenue to finance a new album.206 The fans obliged and the band 
earned $20,000 in royalties.207 This request would not usually warrant any 
accusations of fraud except, here, the album consisted of nothing but silence.208 
Additionally, in 2015, the band Ohm & Sport created an application entitled 
Eternify.209 The application let fans listen to the band’s music on recurring 30 second 
loops, triggering substantial boosts in royalty payments.210 When questioned 
regarding the application, Ohm & Sport contested that because success in streaming 
is slanted towards major artists, the band used the application in order to compete in 
the marketplace.211 Fans similarly used looping software to help Nelly pay a $2.4 
million tax debt.212  
 Although playola and payola are very similar in practice and effect, payola laws 
only cover pay-for-play in broadcasting.213 There are currently no direct laws to 
protect affected artists, labels, rightsholders, or music consumers from manipulated 
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music streaming playlists via playola.214 However, the manipulation of data affects 
royalty payouts to other artists, labels and rightsholders.215 Manipulated playlists do 
not just affect these parties, but also affect the choice of the consumer.216 These 
manipulations create not only unfair competition in the marketplace for artists and 
rightsholders, but also manipulates how the music consumer discovers new music by 
manipulating consumer choice. The law should be changed to include protections 
against playola.   
V. DIGITAL MUSIC SERVICE FRAUD 
Digital music platforms have also been accused of committing music streaming 
fraud.217  Various digital music services have been accused of diluting the royalty 
pool for their own benefit by creating their own songs and placing those songs on 
popular playlists.218 Another digital music platform has been accused of outright data 
manipulation.219 
Spotify has been accused of creating their own fake artists and hiring producers 
to generate songs to dilute royalty payouts so Spotify may retain a higher net 
income.220 Tim Ingham, in a Music Business Worldwide article, cites multiple 
unnamed sources that have accused Spotify of paying producers a flat fee, in addition 
to studio and musician expenses, to create tracks with certain musical 
specifications.221 Spotify then holds the master recording rights, where the publishing 
ownership rights are negotiated between the parties.222 These tracks, upon 
completion, are then placed on popular playlists (jazz, chill, peaceful piano) and then 
collect money from the royalty pool with other rightsholders.223 Although Spotify 
has been accused of creating music in order to dilute the royalty pool and decrease 
royalty payouts to other artists, Spotify, if true, is still actually creating music that, 
receives streams from real listeners.224 These are not auto-generated compositions as 
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is the case with bots.225 However, these songs are specifically created for placement 
on the most popular playlists of certain genres.226 As previously mentioned, 
placement on popular playlists significantly boosts streams and market share that 
allows these compositions and recordings to acquire a much greater portion of 
royalties from the royalty pool.227 Although the sources stated that this practice was 
to intended by Spotify to perfectly curate a playlist to consumer preference, the 
compositions nevertheless increase Spotify profits at the expense of other artists.228 
In 2018, a Norwegian financial newspaper229 accused the music streaming service 
Tidal of falsifying tens of millions of streams in favor of certain artists.230 
Specifically, the digital service was accused of manipulating stream numbers in favor 
of Beyoncé’s album Lemonade and Kanye West’s album Life of Pablo.231 In June 
2020, the Norwegian Supreme Court revealed that Tidal had been an official suspect 
in an investigation by Norwegian authorities for about a year for streaming 
manipulation.232 Further, the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled that Norwegian 
authorities could seize Tidal’s proprietary documents in order for authorities to 
further conduct their investigation.233   
All these fraudulent practices dilute royalty payouts to legitimate licensors.234 
Because the current royalty pool is distributed based on market share and prorated 
number of streams, there is an argument to protect those legitimate members of the 
royalty pool.235 
Additionally, in the recent Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making 
and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords III) issued by the Copyright Royalty 
Board in February of 2019, the Copyright Royalty Board determined that the digital 
music services did not have to pay for fraudulent streams by a quantitative 
measure.236 In the definitions section of 37 C.F.R. § 385, the definition of “Play” 
excludes any same stream played by a single end user more than 50 straight times237 
as that stream is considered fraudulent. The definition makes sense, but it doesn’t 
answer or solve various fraud issues. This definition does not consider any fraudulent 
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stream manipulation by the service itself.238 The definition also does not define any 
rules for when a streaming service does not immediately recognize fraud but paid out 
royalties before the fraudulent activity was detected by the service.239  
VI. PREVENTION? WHAT PREVENTION? 
A. Why Has Little Been Done to Actively Prevent Fraud and Playola? 
The digital music platforms and the music industry have done very little to prevent 
music streaming fraud and playola.240 This lack of implementation has led to a lot of 
music industry-wide speculation of fraud.241 Some speculation is pointed at the 
digital music platforms because direct admission that the fraud is as prevalent as 
speculated could hurt their public image and current business relationships.242   
Most of the speculation, however, is pointed at the Spotify platform directly and 
the deals that Spotify initially formed with the major labels.243 In initial negotiations 
between the majors244 and Spotify, Spotify needed to license the major labels’ 
catalogs in order to offer enough popular music to provide a viable business model.245 
As payment for these licenses, Spotify gave each major label an equity partnership 
in the company.246 If Spotify admitted fraud, this could decrease the value of the 
equity that each major label holds in the company.247 As a result, it is in the interest 
of both Spotify and the major labels to protect Spotify’s reputation. Neither side has 
incentive to expose the fraud.248 Additionally, the admission of fraud could hold the 
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company secondarily liable, further decreasing the value of Spotify and thus the 
equity that the labels maintain.249   
There is also some speculation that the music industry does not work towards 
preventive fraud measures as it would expose various playola schemes that all parties 
may have committed.250 In either case, the boosts in streams helps the label’s bottom 
line and leaves those labels, artists, music publishers and songwriters that do not 
participate in playola schemes exposed to decreased royalties.251 Additionally, some 
of the labels may have participated in playola practices only to compete with other 
labels that participate in the practice.   
The unfortunate possibility is that proper fraud prevention methods have not been 
put in place as it might expose the playola by music industry insiders and fraud 
committed internally by the digital music services.252 In order for proper measures to 
be implemented, fraud prevention may require Congressional involvement by 
legislative action.   
B. Current Prevention Methods 
 Some forms of policing playola have been introduced in the industry, but the 
effectiveness of those measures has been limited. Preventive measures have included 
a development of an industry code of conduct253 and third-party technological 
developments to monitor and detect fraudulent streaming patterns.254   
 In June of 2019, record companies, music publishers, industry organizations 
and streaming services partnered and signed a 21-point “code of conduct” created to 
prevent and eliminate fake music streams.255 This code of conduct defines streaming 
manipulation as “the artificial creation of plays, by human or non-human means, of 
online and offline plays on audio and audio-visual streaming services, i.e., where 
those plays do not represent genuine listening.”256 Under this code, artificial creation 
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includes, but is not limited to, the manipulation of streams through automated 
processes (“bots,” “click-farms” or “stream farms”).257 The code is not legally 
binding on the industry or any of the signatories, and does not affect any terms and 
conditions of any private agreements of the parties.258 This code of conduct has been 
highly criticized throughout the music industry because it lacks enforcement 
mechanisms and many critics feel the code will do nothing to prevent future 
streaming manipulation.259 According to these critics, the code consists only of 
“imprecise promises by the streaming services to monitor and crack down on illegal 
streaming activity . . .  [and] imprecise pledges by labels to share information” when 
possible fraud is detected.260   
 Another development in playola prevention is the emergence of third-party 
companies that have developed software that may be able to detect fraudulent 
activity.261 This software recognizes patterns of streaming manipulation that may 
occur through fake user accounts, fake artists, and streaming farms.262 The software 
is supposed to detect sudden shifts in listener patterns and determine whether the 
activity is legitimate.263   
 Unfortunately, there have been no developments to prevent old payola 
schemes, like pay-for-play for radio airplay, from infiltrating music streaming 
platforms and manipulating curated playlists, in turn diluting the royalty pool. 
VII. I’M NOT LIABLE – YOU’RE LIABLE 
A. Why Litigation Is Not the Answer 
Before the Communications Act of 1934 was amended, while payola was not 
expressly illegal, it may nevertheless have constituted actionable fraud or unfair 
competition. The practice of playola is in a similar situation today. There are many 
forms of music streaming fraud, but as of today’s date, little has been done to prevent 
it. Rightsholders have been able to identify inconsistencies in playlist reports, and 
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therefore, one would think that litigation is imminent.264 But why haven’t more 
lawsuits been filed by the rightsholders against these third-party streaming promotion 
companies? Why haven’t rightsholders filed complaints against the digital music 
platforms themselves? The reason is because successful litigation is almost 
impossible in these cases.265   
 The most comparable legal analysis to determine why music streaming fraud is 
not litigated is best answered in the litigation of “click fraud” in advertising.266 Click 
fraud is defined as a type of fraud that is committed by repeatedly clicking an 
advertisement to fraudulently increase the cost to an advertiser.267 Many companies 
have tried to file complaints that contain claims of click fraud against Google, 
Facebook and many others, but most of these cases were dismissed by the court, or 
at the very least, the click fraud claim was dismissed.268   
 Most of these dismissals are due to an insufficient showing of fraud.269 Under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b), any claim of fraud is subject to 
heightened pleading requirements.270 This heightened pleading requirement means 
that a plaintiff that alleges fraud is required to state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting the instance or instances of fraud.271 The plaintiff must 
identify the “who, what, where, when and how” of the alleged misconduct and why 
that misconduct is fraudulent.272 If a plaintiff does not have an inside source that can 
obtain particular documentation that demonstrates an instance of fraud, the plaintiff 
may only have circumstantial evidence of the possibility of fraud. Circumstantial 
evidence does not meet the exact “who, what, where, when and how” the heightened 
pleading requires.273   
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 Further, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 
sufficiency of a claim.”274 In Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., the Court determined 
that based on 12(b)(6), a Court’s dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable 
legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a particular cognizable 
legal theory.275 Again, this sufficiency of alleged facts is an issue in click fraud 
accusations against advertising platforms.276 Although there may be indications of 
fraud or the possibility that fraud exists based upon a trail of miscellaneous 
documents, merely conclusory statements stringing these facts together will not meet 
the heightened pleading requirement of fraud and will fall short of establishing 
sufficient facts to meet the burden of proof.277 In fact, the Ashcroft v. Iqbal Court 
stated, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all allegations contained in a 
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of 
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.”278 
Although the Court examining the facts of a click fraud case may accept the facts of 
the case as true, the facts themselves may not draw enough conclusory evidence to 
proceed at trial.279 In fact, these cases usually result in just that: a string of facts that 
may be true, but not enough to provide sufficient evidence of fraud.280   
 As with click fraud, complaints of music streaming fraud would also typically 
lack sufficient facts to meet the heightened pleading requirements of fraud. 
Rightsholders may be able to show irregularities in chart reporting and show that 
users have notified them of irregular listening activity on their accounts, but those 
few pieces are likely to fall short of the court’s requirements of a heightened 
pleading.281 When labels have reported these accusations to the digital music 
platforms, these platforms have remained silent on whether these specific reports are 
fraudulent, let alone whether additional fraud exists.282 The digital music services 
hold all of the evidence on specific circumstances of any fraudulent activity and it is 
unlikely those services would provide that information to a rightsholder for fear the 
platform could also be held liable for the fraudulent activity or practices.283  
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What about the unidentified fraudulent accounts that have manipulated the royalty 
pool?  For those fraudsters that have auto-generated compositions and created fake 
artist accounts, rightsholders may have little success in litigation.284 First, the 
rightsholder cannot go after the fraudster unless that person can be identified or 
tracked.285 Second, without sufficient facts of the fraud itself, as evidence of which 
is only in possession of a digital music platform, any litigation under a vicarious 
liability claim against a digital music service would meet the same fate as click fraud 
cases.286   
Additionally, fraudsters are uploading unreleased albums or songs of artists 
without rightsholders’ permission.287 The digital music platforms have been notified 
of the copyright infringing activity of some users, but the infringing activity 
continues to occur.288 In cases such as these, the digital music service may be held as 
a contributory infringer.289 In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Court stated 
that in order for a plaintiff to establish contributory infringement, the plaintiff must 
show that a defendant had a reasonable knowledge of a specific infringement, knows 
or should know that infringing material is available on the platform, and fails to act 
to prevent viral distribution.290 However, these elements may also be impossible for 
a potential plaintiff to prove with mere circumstantial evidence. 
B. How the Digital Music Services MAY Be Held Contributory Liable Based on 
Past Precedent 
When a fraudster uploads the copyrighted material to a digital music platform in 
order to manipulate the royalty pool, a digital platform may be held contributory 
liable.291 Typically, an artist, label, publisher or songwriter will notify the digital 
platform that the infringing material exists.292 Typically, in these cases, a digital 
music platform like Spotify will remove the infringing material per their terms of 
use.293 However, although Spotify may have removed the material as infringing, the 
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material may reappear under a different user account.294 Multiple infringing songs 
from the same artist appear to replace each removed infringing composition.295 Many 
times, these infringing uses become viral and gain extensive royalty revenue before 
the infringing compositions are taken down by the digital music platform296 and a 
royalty check has already been sent to the infringing party.297 As a result, the royalty 
pool is diluted.298  This contributory infringement has expanded past the days of 
Napster, when an infringing Napster download only supplanted a sale of the affected 
artists’ song, and moved into a universe in which every rightsholder is affected by 
one single act of copyright infringement because the dilution of the royalty pool 
affects all participants in the streaming marketplace.299 The digital music platform is 
ultimately in control of everything on the platform and is thus in the best place to 
implement preventative measures to protect the copyrights of licensors.300   
Further, in BMG Rights Management (US), LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc. 
(“BMG I”), the District Court found Cox Communications liable for contributory 
infringement for third-party users.301 In this instance, Cox subscribers shared 
copyrighted files that the subscriber did not have permission to do.302 Cox maintained 
that their user agreement reserved the right to suspend or terminate subscribers who 
use Cox services to post, copy, transmit or disseminate any content that infringes the 
copyrights of another party.303 However, Cox rarely terminated accounts of repeat 
infringers and when Cox did terminate infringers’ accounts, it always reactivated 
those accounts.304 Additionally, Cox had only created a limited automated system to 
handle notifications of infringement and, although maintaining a thirteen strike 
policy against users that infringe on another’s property rights, the policy was rarely 
implemented.305   
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By the following year, Cox Communications was sued again by 53 members of 
the RIAA for unauthorized downloads and distribution across its network.306 Cox 
had attempted to adopt a policy to respond to alleged acts of infringement.307 Cox 
received and processed notices of infringement and had implemented a program to 
notify subscribers identified in those received notices.308 The plaintiffs, in the 
complaint, identified Cox accounts that had received three or more infringement 
notices and established those accounts as the basis for Cox’s liability.309 This Court 
applied the holding of Luvdarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC that defined the proper 
standard of knowledge as “specific enough knowledge of infringement that the 
defendant could do something about it.”310 In Perfect 10 v. Amazon, Inc, and as 
applied by this Court, the Court also held this same standard but also determined that 
a service provider’s knowing failure to prevent infringing actions could be the basis 
for imposing contributory infringement.311 A proper notification may include 
information and specific data about an individual infringing account, specific 
infringing activity of that individual user, a time stamp for the infringing data, and 
the date the notice was sent.312 The Court determined because the plaintiff’s 
notifications included the above-mentioned information, Cox was knowledgeable of 
specific instances of infringement and, therefore, could be held contributory liable.313 
The Cox case is slightly different than some of the actions that the digital music 
platforms take today. Users may be removed at a digital music platform’s discretion, 
if the platform sees any patterns of infringing activity.314 Each platform, like Cox, 
includes a policy in their terms and conditions of service that warns any user that 
copyright infringement of any kind will not be tolerated.315 Spotify has instituted a 
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 311. Id. at 230 (citing Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 503 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007). See generally 
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 503 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “a computer system operator 
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 312. Sony Music Ent., 426 F.Supp. 3d. at 231-232. 
 313. Id. at 232. 
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services/itunes/us/terms.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2019) (explaining that you may not use the Services to plan 
or engage in any illegal, fraudulent, or manipulative activity); Peoples, supra note 7 (explaining that Spotify’s 
head of communications announced “new terms of service…prohibit selling accounts and playlists or “accepting 
any compensation, financial or otherwise, to influence…the content included on an account or playlist).  
 315. APPLE, INC., APPLE MEDIA TERMS AND CONDITIONS, https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-
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fraud detection department.316 However, what makes Cox relevant is that despite 
Cox’s attempt to facilitate an intellectual property abuse department, Cox did not 
implement their abuse prevention policies well enough to avoid potential 
contributory liability.317 It is time to apply these same standards to the digital music 
streaming platforms, as despite the steps they have taken, these platforms still have 
not addressed the fundamental forms of streaming fraud that have been around for 
years.318 This fraud does not continue to be a problem because fraudsters find new 
ways to manipulate the royalty pool and falsely induce monetary gain, although they 
do.319 The same types of fraud from over five years ago are still significantly diluting 
the royalty pool in the exact same way as it did five years ago.320 The digital music 
platforms have not created any sufficient solution to combat early types of fraud, let 
alone new fraud developments.321 Additionally, any user that has been deleted from 
a digital platform can simply sign up as another user.322 Further, there are some 
instances where some sources have alleged that infringing user accounts have not 
been terminated in apparent violation of Spotify’s own user agreements.323 If this is 
the case, and the users have not rectified their infringing behavior, Spotify may be 
held contributory liable.324   
C. What About Safe Harbor Provisions? 
But, what about safe harbor protections under the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (“DMCA”)?325 Is Spotify protected from contributory infringement claims by 
the safe harbor protections of the DMCA?326 Because Spotify is a direct licensee of 
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 320. Clinch, supra note 11. 
 321. Leight, supra note 1; Hu, supra note 7; Nicolaou, supra note 194; Wang, supra note 2. 
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 323. Hu, supra note 7. 
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copyrighted works, Spotify may not qualify for protection under the DMCA.327 In 
order to obtain DMCA protections, Spotify first must be considered an online service 
provider within the definition of 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).328 Under this definition, Spotify 
could argue that it is an online service provider under a transitory communications 
business.329 A transitory communication business is a business that provides 
connections for its users.330 Spotify is a transitory communication business because 
Spotify connects users to the Spotify music database without changing or modifying 
the content of the music or any other material that is received by the rightsholders.331 
The DMCA safe harbor provisions332 were established to protect internet 
companies from the massive piracy that occurs online.333 However, for a transitory 
digital network to qualify under the safe harbor protections, the transitory digital 
network is subject to the following conditions: (1) the data transmission was initiated 
by or at the direction of a person other than the service provider; (2) the data 
transmission . . .  is carried out through an automated technical process without 
selection of the material by the service provider; (3) the service provider does not 
select the recipients of the material except as an automatic response to the request of 
another person; (4) the intermediate or transit copies that are stored on the service 
provider’s system must not be accessible other than to anticipated recipients, and 
these copies must not be maintained on the system for longer than is necessary for 
the transmission; and (5) the service provider must not have modified the content of 
the transmitted data.334 Under these qualifications, Spotify does not fall under safe 
harbor protections.335 First, and as previously mentioned, Spotify has its own 
editorial playlists where, although mostly automated, have human intervention in the 
selection process.336 Second, Spotify is directly knowledgeable about online music 
piracy of its licensed works.337 Spotify is required to obtain a license for each and 
every song distributed on its site, and it must therefore know with particularity about 
each item of content on the site.338 Although the direct deals with labels may 
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excusably fall under a safe harbor protection, the licenses required for music 
publishers and songwriters under 17 U.S.C. § 115 may not.339 It is Spotify’s statutory 
obligation to obtain all § 115 licenses and one would be hard-pressed to excuse 
Spotify under a safe harbor protection for a misrepresented composition when 
platform algorithms can identify artist compositions by individual music tastes of 
end users.340  
D. Well, Litigation May Work When the Universe Aligns Just Right  
There have also been instances where a fraudster releases unreleased material by 
an artist under an account claiming to be said artist without artist or rightsholder 
permissions.341 Because the material is posted without permission by any owner of 
the copyrights, this action of the fraudster would be copyright infringement and the 
fraudster could be subject to criminal penalty.342   
According to the Copyright Office and the Copyright Act, “copyright 
infringement occurs when a copyrighted work is reproduced, distributed, performed, 
publicly displayed, or made into a derivative work without the permission of the 
copyright owner.”343 The penalty for copyright infringement is either the actual 
dollar amount of damages and profits or statutory damages ranging from $200 to 
$150,000 for each work that was infringed.344 Statutory damages are awarded based 
upon evidence provided by the plaintiff in a copyright infringement lawsuit.345 In the 
instance of a fraudster uploading copyrighted material without permission and that 
has also not been released, it is likely that a jury would find a fraudster guilty of 
copyright infringement, that is assuming the fraudster could be identified.346   
After the onset of the Napster litigation,347 the RIAA filed 261 lawsuits against 
individuals that illegally shared copyrighted music on the internet.348 These 
individuals were targeted as a group that shared folders containing more than 1000 
copyrights on file sharing platforms like KaZaa and allowed millions of users to 
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download those compositions illegally.349 The lawsuits were strictly to deter the 
pattern of illegally traded copyrighted material and to change perceptual patterns that 
the illegal trade could continue without punishment.350 As the 261 lawsuits were 
filed, the RIAA also announced a ‘clean slate program.’351 The clean slate program 
provided amnesty for any file sharer that turned themselves in before legal action 
was taken against them.352 The lawsuits were nothing more than a tactic to prevent 
behaviors of ongoing copyright infringement amongst the general public.353   
In this instance of copyright infringement and where the fraudster could be 
identified, such lawsuits could occur again and the courts could award a plaintiff 
substantial statutory damages. These awards could once again act as a significant 
deterrent from future fraudsters attempting the same type of music streaming fraud. 
However, such cases would only be able to proceed on the extremely limited chance 
that a rightsholder could identify a particular fraudster and show enough evidence to 
substantiate that fraud existed. As previously mentioned throughout this comment, 
this identification and evidence of fraud is almost impossible for rightsholders to 
obtain.   
VIII. INDUSTRY SOLUTIONS 
A. User-Centric Royalty Models 
Many industry commentators have suggested that moving away from the current 
per stream royalty structure to a user-based model would help contain music 
streaming fraud and playola practices.354 Deezer355 is expected to launch this user-
based royalty model upon obtaining licenses with rightsholders.356 In a user-based 
model, the pro-rated royalty pool is based on a single individuals user’s account and 
the streams of that individual user.357 If a particular user only streamed the songs of 
one artist for the entirety of a month, all of the royalty pool revenue would be paid 
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to the rightsholders associated with those streamed compositions.358 The current 
royalty model for subscription-based services bases royalties on all streams listened 
throughout the entirety of the platform by all users.359 Under the user-centric model, 
royalties would no longer be distributed based on an aggregate of all streams.360 This 
method could be used to limit fraudulent activity to a particular user account, as a 
particular fraudster’s royalty income would be limited to the individual fraudsters 
account; in other words, when a fraudster sets up a user account to boost streams by 
click fraud, the fraudster would never receive more royalty income than the fraudster 
put in setting up that account as all royalty income would be based off of the activity 
of that one account.361 A user-centric model will not allow for a fraudster to set up a 
user account in the hopes to defraud the system.362 Currently, all user streams are 
collectively accounted by using one royalty pool.363 In a user-centric model, the 
royalty pool is refocused to individual users.364 So, if a fraudster sought to stream 
songs in a manner to defraud the royalty pool, that royalty pool will be limited to that 
individual user, so the fraudster could not gain any more income than was already 
put into the account.365 
However, there are many issues with this model and much criticism within the 
industry regarding it. One particular criticism is that the user-centric royalty payout 
would no longer provide a viable royalty model for all rightsholders.366 In a Spotify 
conducted study, Will Page, Spotify’s then Chief Economist, suggests that a digital 
platform’s cost to switch from the current pro-rata royalty platform to a user-centric 
royalty platform would result in higher administrative costs that would be deducted 
from the overall royalty pool; therefore, decreasing the overall royalty distribution to 
all rightsholders.367 Additionally, although a Finnish based user-centric model study 
declares that a move to a user-centric model would decrease the overall royalties of 
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the 0.4% top earning artists from 9.9% to 5.6% (with the remaining 4.3% allocated 
to mid-tier artists and rightsholders), Page mentions that the Finnish study itself 
acknowledges significant variations of these numbers of +/- 50% and the Finnish 
study concluded that these fluctuations are not rare occurrences.368 With such 
significant variations, it would be hard to determine, at this time, whether there is 
any significant shift in royalty allocation that would favor lesser known artists in a 
user-centric royalty model.369   
Moreover, and in further criticism of the user-centric model, it is impossible to 
predict the listening behavior of an average consumer to know whether any 
significant shift in royalty allocation would occur using this model.370 Such 
unpredictability may occur in how an average listener is exposed to any given 
artist.371 For instance, if most listeners depend on playlists to introduce them to new 
music, fraud may become hugely impactful to a user-centric model. Most proponents 
of a user-centric model claim that a move to this model will help to alleviate types 
of fraud like the Bulgarian scam previously mentioned.372 However, this model does 
not account for the industry’s use of playola and alleged digital platform fraud to 
boost streams and manipulate playlists.373 Many listeners rely on playlists to find new 
music or as a convenient way to listen to music based on mood, which then exposes 
the listener to new music.374 If industry insiders pay their way on to those playlists 
or digital platforms manipulate those playlists to benefit themselves (or for any 
reason), independent artists may lose access to those playlists which eliminates a 
significant portion of potential royalty income for that independent artist and 
associated rightsholders.375 Playlists help generate income by exposure.376 When one 
person finds a composition from a playlist that they like, that person may add the 
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composition to their own playlist.377 This person’s addition can cause other followers 
to do the same, exponentially increasing the market share of that composition.378 If 
playola, or other forms of fraud, limits an artist’s playlist exposure, that artist may 
never achieve enough activity to produce any significant royalty income under a 
user-centric royalty model.379   
B. Music Industry-Wide Policing Measures  
There are multiple ways that the music industry and digital music platforms can 
police fraud. First, the music industry can invest in stream-farm crackdowns.380 The 
three major labels generated more than $13 billion in revenue in 2019.381 The labels 
could commit to a specific level of financing to fund both an investigation of stream 
farms and subsequent litigation against stream farm operators.382 This has already 
occurred in other countries. In 2018, the U.K.-based PPL, a performance music 
licensing company, donated £1.5 million of member money towards fraud 
prevention.383 This donated amount only represented 0.6% of the organization’s total 
collections on behalf of labels and artists.384 SoundExchange, in the United States, 
could provide similar funding with permission of their represented labels and 
artists.385 The digital music platforms can provide a similar financial commitment to 
develop more effective policing software and empower current anti-fraud 
departments.386   
Additionally, the digital music platforms could also commit to a specific level of 
financing to help prevent fraudulent activities on their platforms in a more effective 
manner than current implementations and further empower antifraud employment 
teams.387 Currently, although the companies may have fraud detection departments, 
the same types of fraud exist today that did over five years ago.388 With sufficient 
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investment, a service may be able to create more efficient fraud prevention software 
while also building trust and good faith with content licensors.389 
Companies can also hire third-party fraud detection services.390 Although this is a 
relatively new service, there are companies that help prevent fraudulent activity.391 
DistroKid,392 because of a strategic partnership with Audible Magic, can now 
identify “extreme manipulations of rate, pitch and tempo” by using small audio 
clips.393 Upon announcement of this partnership, DistroKid also announced the 
release of a new, free resource to artists called DistroLock.394 DistroLock is available 
to any artist, not just DistroKid clients.395 The artist may use the system to upload 
and register unreleased tracks to the service and have that track encoded with a 
unique audio fingerprint.396 DistroLock then encodes these audio tracks with an 
audio fingerprint and uploads them to the Audible Magic registry.397 Audible Magic 
then uses these audio fingerprints to block unauthorized music, such as previously 
unreleased tracks, from appearing on streaming services.398 
Rebeat399 is another service currently under development to help prevent 
streaming fraud.400 Rebeat is a solution for labels to monitor and detect any irregular 
streaming activity of label content.401 Rebeat analyzes an individual label or artist 
statement from any of the digital music platforms and flags any irregularities in 
data.402 For instance, the program identifies any irregular “spikes in data” and helps 
determine if that spike was an error or attempted fraud.403   
 
 389. Ingham, supra note 13. 
 390. See Eggerton, supra note 254; Hu, supra note 7; see also Fraud Detection Software, REBEAT, supra 
note 262. 
 391. See Eggerton, supra note 254; Hu, supra note 7; see also Fraud Detection Software, REBEAT, supra 
note 262. 
 392. DistroKid is a digital distribution service that distributes the music of independent music artists to digital 
music streaming platforms.  DistroKid, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DistroKid (last visited Dec. 28, 
2020). 
 393. Eggerton, supra note 254. Audible Magic is a content identification company that helps rightsholders 
identify and protect their copyrighted material.  Audible Magic, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Audible_Magic (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
 394. Eggerton, supra note 254. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Rebeat is a third-party service that is developing software to combat music streaming fraud on digital 
music streaming platforms.  REBEAT, supra note 262. 
 400. Hu, supra note 7; see also REBEAT, supra note 262. 
 401. REBEAT, supra note 262. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
Smith-Burton (Do Not Delete) 8/10/2021  10:03 PM 
CHRISTINE SMITH BURTON 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 425 
C. Industry Penalties 
The music industry and digital music services, in cooperation with companies like 
Billboard that control music industry charts can enact instant chart penalties for 
artists engaging in streaming fraud, as suggested by some industry journalists.404 Any 
party caught in fraudulent streaming activity would be subject to an automatic chart 
penalty.405 Under this enforcement scheme, the chart position of a song or album 
released by a violating party would be reduced by deducting the stream count by 
some decided numeric value for a certain amount of releases.406 The number of 
releases that would be affected could be determined by the severity of the fraudulent 
infraction or how many times the violating party has committed that infraction.407 
This same penalty could also be determined by a predetermined number of releases 
based on the type of infraction.408 The impact of such a chart penalty could keep 
some artists from reaching top charting position, deterring future fraudulent 
streaming activities.409 
Further, digital music service employees or music industry employees can be 
penalized for any engagement in playola to manipulate music streaming playlists or 
participate in any form of music streaming fraud.410 For instance, Sony released an 
internal memorandum to all employees that stated that no employee is permitted to 
engage in playola or any music streaming fraud.411 However, the internal memo 
contained no direct penalties or consequences that would occur if any employee was 
caught fraudulently boosting streams.412 Although this is an important step, it is not 
enough as employees that may engage in playola or fraudulent music streaming 
practices may not be deterred from the practice without possible ramifications for 
their actions.413  
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IX. HOW CURRENT LEGISLATION CAN SERVE AS A BASIS FOR NEW MUSIC 
STREAMING FRAUD LEGISLATION 
A. Current Applicable Laws  
Currently, there are two statutes that currently could be applied to music streaming 
fraud: The Federal Trade Commission Act414 (“FTC Act”) that prevents actions of 
fraud and deceptive practice, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act415 (“CFAA”) 
that prevents fraud on the Internet.   
The FTC Act416 prevents unfair and deceptive practices by persons, partnerships, 
or corporations.417 Unfair acts are those acts that will cause substantial injury to a 
consumer that cannot be reasonably avoided by that consumer and is not outweighed 
by any countervailing benefit or any other company that may be in competition with 
the business causing the injury;418 and deceptive acts are acts by a business that 
involve a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead a consumer.419 
For instance, deception can occur when a particular business has actively tried to 
conceal the truth about a particular product or service420 or when a business does not 
disclose information about a product or service that a reasonable person would expect 
the business to disclose.421 The FTC Act422 also allows the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) to investigate reports of deceptive practices of a business.423  
The FTC Act424 could be applied to both music streaming fraud and playola. If 
companies like Spotify are diluting the royalty pool purposefully to decrease royalty 
payouts, this could be cause for the FTC to initiate an investigation.425 If the FTC 
were to find the fraudulent streams to be a deceptive practice, penalties and 
repercussions would follow and may help to diminish the practice.426 Additionally, 
through reports of fraud and investigations, the FTC could find that companies like 
 
 414. See generally The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1914). 
 415. See generally The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1984). 
 416. 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 417. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
 418. Federal Trade Commission Act or Practices, FEDERAL RESERVE, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
 419. The Federal Trade Commission: Deceptive Practices Affecting Consumers, JUSTIA, 
https://www.justia.com/consumer/enforcing-your-rights-as-a-consumer/the-federal-trade-commission/ (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. 
 422. 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 423. Id. 
 424. 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 425. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
 426. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
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Spotify are aware of fraudulent activity and do not perform due diligence in 
monitoring fraudulent activity by third parties.427   
Furthermore, the FTC could perform an investigation, as they did with payola, to 
find whether the music industry or the digital music platforms themselves are 
offering money (or any other form of payment) to curators to have their songs placed 
on influential playlists, or any playlists at all.428 Although playola is not illegal as 
payola is,429 this practice could nevertheless be considered misleading to the 
consumer.430  If the playlists are not based on the choice of the consumer through 
consumers’ overall listening patterns but are manipulated by a fraudulent party, the 
fraudulent party is forcing the consumer to listen to products they would not normally 
listen to and prevents the playlist from being one that is based on a song’s popularity 
due to consumer preference.431   
The CFAA432 may also be used to prevent further acts of music streaming fraud.433 
Because music streaming is currently being undermined by the use of bots to rack up 
royalty streams and increase royalty payouts, any ligating party may be able to file 
suit under § 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA against any party committing or that has 
committed music streaming fraud.434 Although application would require a broader 
reading of the statute, this Section considers it a crime to “knowingly, and with the 
intent to defraud, access[] a protected computer without authorization, or exceed[] 
authorized access . . .  and obtain anything of value.”435 The phrase “obtain anything 
of value” includes obtaining subscribers, and Courts could easily interpret the law to 
apply to increased streams, which in turn increases royalty payouts, to be something 
of value.436   
The judicial interpretation of the Statute and whether that interpretation can be 
broadly applied is split between the judicial circuits.437 The broader interpretation, as 
would be required in instances of music streaming fraud, could only apply in those 
 
 427. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b); See generally Report Fraud to the FTC, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/faq/consumer-protection/submit-consumer-complaint-ftc (last visited Dec. 18, 2020). 
 428. See generally Seagrave, supra note 136, at 94-100. 
 429. Payola is only illegal if “sponsorship” of a composition on a particular broadcast playlist is not revealed 
to the listening public. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1960). 
 430. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
 431. Id. 
 432. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 433. See generally Rohan Parekh, Applying Broader Interpretations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Could Help Curb Fraudulent Plays on Music Streaming Platforms, J. OF GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. (Jun. 11, 
2018), http://www.jgspl.org/applying-broader-interpretations-of-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-could-help-
curb-fraudulent-plays-on-music-streaming-platforms/. 
 434. Id.; see also Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (1986). 
 435. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). 
 436. Parekh, supra note 433. 
 437. Id. 
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circuits where the court has determined that the terms of service are subject to the 
CFAA.438 Currently, the First and the Fifth Circuits are the only Circuits that interpret 
the CFAA as applicable to a violation of terms of use to control the scope of 
authorization.439 These Circuits have supported this broader interpretation of the 
Statute within the legislative history of the CFAA440 that suggests that the law be 
responsive to changes in technology and increased hacker sophistication.441 These 
Circuit Courts have interpreted this history to apply to changes of the scope of 
authorization as technology develops.442 With this knowledge of the legislative 
history and the already adopted broader interpretation of the First and Fifth Circuits, 
other Circuits should adopt the broader interpretation in order to prevent the 
devaluation of online agreements and terms of service.443 Additionally, by providing 
a broader interpretation of the statute, the CFAA could apply a criminal liability as a 
potential deterrent of future fraudulent music streaming activity.444 
B. Legislative Action 
The FTC Act and the CFAA might help address some aspects of fraud, but a 
comprehensive statutory scheme is required to effectively combat all aspects of 
playola and music streaming fraud. At this point, legislative action to prevent playola 
is necessary and the only real means to combat playola, if an effective statute could 
be passed. As explained in supra Sections IV and VII, playola prohibits some 
companies from participating in the market on an equal footing, and these companies 
cannot successfully sue because of their inability to prove the fraudulent activity in 
court.445 However, and as previously mentioned in supra Section IV,446 every artist 
and rightsholder deserves the right to fair competition in the marketplace, and every 
music consumer deserves the chance to discover and enjoy the best music. Playola 
 
 438. Id. 
 439. Parekh, supra note 433 (citing United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that 
“authorized access” or “authorized” encompasses limits placed on the use of information obtained through 
permitted access to a computer system and data available on that system)).  The author further states that “in 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Nosal that criminal prosecution under the CFAA’s “exceeding 
authorized access” provisions could not be based on violating contractual “use” restrictions but must be linked 
to contractual or technological “access” restrictions.”); see also EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, 274 F.3d 
577. 582 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding terms of use and access restrictions control the scope of “authorization.”)). 
 440. Parekh, supra note 433 (citing S. Rep. No. 140-357, at 11 (1996) (discussing how the CFAA 
amendments reflect the importance of the new ways hackers manipulate technologies)). 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. 
 443. Id. 
 444. Id. 
 445. See supra Section VIII; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 446. See supra Section IV. 
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practices not only distort the marketplace but suppress listener choice. A 
comprehensive statutory solution is required.   
Congressional action is required to remedy the growing problem of fraud in the 
music industry. As in the early days of payola, Congress will need to launch an 
investigation or hearings into the possibility of and speculations regarding playola. 
Based upon this information, Congress must establish a law that specifically states 
that playola is an illegal practice. Multiple laws establish precedent guiding the form 
of an anti-playola law: the Payola clause of the Federal Communications Act 
(“FCA”),447 the FTC Act,448 and CFAA.449  
 The FCA’s payola provisions450 could serve as legislative precedent in favor of 
anti-playola laws. The practice of payola and playola are strikingly similar, but the 
current payola laws only apply to radio broadcasts.451 The FCA has no applicability 
to music streaming and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has no 
authority over fraudulent activity of interactive music streaming.452 But, because the 
practices and outcome are similar, Congress could easily make the connection and 
create a statute to protect the consumer from fraudulent activity on music streaming 
playlists.453   
 The FTC Act454 was passed into law to prevent deceptive acts on consumers 
and unfair business methods of competition in the marketplace, and a similar law 
could guide an anti-playola law.455 Digital music streaming fraud is deceptive to the 
consumer because the consumer, when listening to a particular playlist, no longer has 
a real choice in the compositions that are placed on that playlist as those playlists are 
 
 447. See generally Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 317, 508 (1934). 
 448. 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 449. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 450. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508. 
 451. Id. 
 452. Cookson, supra note 33. 
 453. In September of 2019, the FCC Commissioner sent a letter to the RIAA requiring the RIAA to investigate 
payola allegations. The letter followed a Rolling Stone article stating that payola still exists in the form record 
labels and artists using independent promoters for radio playlist promoters. Interestingly, the article points to DJs 
and radio programmers using other station playlists as radio stations are more reluctant to add a song that is not 
being played by any other stations. DJs and radio programmers have also been known to use top music streaming 
playlists to determine their own radio broadcasting playlists. If a music streaming playlist is influenced by 
playola, this could also force radio programming manipulation. If the RIAA were to uncover any payola through 
the use of playola, this discovery could instigate further fraud investigations into record labels and digital music 
services for fraudulent activity if the FCC provided this information to the FTC or DOJ. See Leight, supra note 
181; Peoples, supra note 7. 
 454. 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 455. Federal Trade Commission: History, ALLGOV, http://www.allgov.com/departments/independent-
agencies/federal-trade-commission-ftc?agencyid=7429 (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
Smith-Burton (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2021  10:03 PM 
‘Playola’ and Fraud on Digital Music Platforms 
430 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
influenced by fraud and not by listening preferences or popularity.456 Unfair methods 
of competition affect the market when a fraudster, or multiple fraudsters, auto-
generate tracks in order to manipulate illegitimate financial gains at the detriment of 
the legitimate rightsholders.457 Because of the uniqueness of the types of fraud, 
deceptive acts and unfair methods of competition in the music streaming market, 
Congress should tailor a new anti-playola statute to directly address the music 
streaming industry.   
 Last, Congress could use the CFAA458 to further establish precedent in favor of 
an anti-playola statute. The CFAA459 was enacted by Congress in order to prevent 
hackers from accessing servers without authorization for substantial gain.460 
However, as previously stated, the statute only protects the service platforms and not 
the rightsholders directly.461 The CFAA462 may only protect the digital music 
services in the First and Fifth Circuits as applied to digital music streaming fraud.463 
But, Congress wished for the CFAA464 to be responsive to changes in technology and 
hacker sophistication.465 Unfortunately, most judicial circuits have applied the 
CFAA466 very narrowly even when applied to just the digital music services.467 
However, Congress could further incorporate the elements from the CFAA468 into an 
anti-playola statute, narrowly tailoring aspects of fraud specific to the music 
streaming industry and its effects on both digital music streaming services and 
rightsholders.469   
 Currently, playola is not illegal in the United States. Despite years of 
speculation and unnamed sources affirming its prevalence, Congress has not initiated 
any formal investigation into the matter. Playola seems to be following the same 
direction that payola did, where Congress did not address the issue of payola until 
payola’s impact on the consumer and business competition could no longer be 
 
 456. Hu, supra note 45; See generally Peoples, supra note 7; Peoples, supra note 16; Leight, supra note 1; 
Raymond, supra note 59. 
 457. Vonn, supra note 80. 
 458. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 459. Id. 
 460. See generally Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act?, WIRED (Nov. 
18, 205, 6:38 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-lexicon-computer-fraud-abuse-act/. 
 461. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 462. Id. 
 463. Parekh, supra note 433. 
 464. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 465. Parekh, supra note 433. 
 466. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 467. Parekh, supra note 433 (citing S. Rep. No. 140-357, at 11 (1996) (discussing how the CFAA 
amendments reflect the importance of the new ways hackers manipulate technologies). 
 468. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 469. Parekh, supra note 433. 
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ignored.470 However, despite Congress’ efforts, illegal payola is still present in the 
broadcasting industry.471 Although payola and playola practices are similar, the 
payola statute should only act as a “jumping off” point towards a more effective tool 
to prevent playola practices.472 Additionally, Congress should examine the old 
payola statute to form a basis for an anti-playola statute, but realize, as was the case 
with payola, the same parties that may influence the drafting of the statute may also 
be the same parties benefiting from playola and because of this, without careful 
monitoring, an ineffective statute could be drafted.473   
  Although the practice of payola and playola are strikingly similar, any playola 
laws will need to be applied in a more effective manner than the current payola laws. 
The ineffectiveness of the current payola laws are well-known throughout the 
industry.474 After the payola law became law, the music and radio industry continued 
to find relatively simple ways to avoid detection of payola practices;475 for example, 
many labels began to use independent promoters.476 Even when the 2005 settlement 
agreements forbade the transfer of payola to independent promoters, the labels and 
independent promoters found more sophisticated versions of radio playlist 
manipulation.477 If a similar statutory provision is applied to playola, the same 
avoidance processes may occur with music streaming playlist playola.478 Congress 
should take care to draft a more rigorous anti-playola statute. 
X. A PROPOSED SOLUTION  
A possible solution to combat music streaming fraud is to establish the Copyright 
Office as an independent federal agency.479 Currently, the Copyright Office is a 
separate department of the Library of Congress and all rules and regulations created 
 
 470. See generally Seagrave, supra note 136, at 95. 
 471. Leight, supra note 178. 
 472. Id.; Peoples, supra note 7. 
 473. Owens, supra note 33. 
 474. Messitte, How Payola Laws Keep Independent Artists Off Mainstream Radio, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2014, 
10:25 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nickmessitte/2014/11/30/how-payola-laws-keep-independent-artists-
off-mainstream-radio/?sh=5bba38f8519f. 
 475. Id. 
 476. Id. 
 477. Id. 
 478. Peoples, supra note 7. 
 479. It is important for the Copyright Office to become an independent agency because the Copyright Office 
advices Congress on both domestic and international copyright matters and needs to remain impartial.  The U.S. 
Copyright Office: Its Functions and Resources: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary House of 
Representatives, 114th Cong. 113-16 (2015) (testimony of Maria Pallante, Registrar of Copyrights). 
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by the Copyright Office must be approved by the Librarian of Congress.480 However, 
as an independent federal agency, the Copyright Office could be authorized to 
establish rules, adjudicate and investigate various copyright issues including music 
streaming fraud.481 These various authorities can be limited by Congress, as 
necessary, but can specifically deal with the nuances that arise in the market as 
technology develops.   
There are various justifications for a federal agency to establish regulations on a 
particular market.482 First, although this country has a private market system, the 
markets can become subject to flawed business practice that may damage the market; 
an independent agency can remedy such flaws, like market manipulation and unfair 
trade practices, with regulation.483 Second, an unregulated market can negatively 
impact consumers even if businesses within that market establish economically 
viable and efficient systems.484 Lastly, regulations by agencies conform the market 
principles of business to social values that protect the public interest.485 These values 
include, but are not limited to, basic principles of fairness and equity.486 In the case 
of music streaming fraud, a Copyright Office, as a regulatory agency, could mitigate 
the imperfection of music streaming fraud on the digital music platforms as it affects 
rightsholders. As previously mentioned, various instances of music streaming fraud 
may affect the placement of a composition on a playlist, in turn, impacting not just 
royalty payouts, but what song is placed in front of the consumer. These regulations 
impact the fairness and equity of the market in royalty distributions and fairness in 
consumer choice.   
Throughout the history of the United States, Congress has granted independent 
agencies regulatory, adjudicatory and investigatory abilities.487 For example, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was created to inform and protect 
 
 480. Overview of the Copyright Office, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
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0by%20Congress%20in%201897 (last visited Dec. 28, 2020); 17 U.S.C. § 701(a). 
 481. See Types of Administrative Agency Action, USLEGAL, https://administrativelaw.uslegal.com/three-
types-of-administrative-agency-action-rulemaking-adjudication-investigation/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2020). 
 482. See Independent Agencies of the United States Government, WIKIPEDIA, 
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investors, maintain fair and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.488 The 
SEC has an enforcement division that investigates potential violations of the 
securities laws and recommends whether the Commission should bring any civil 
action in federal court or before administrative law judges.489 The enforcement 
division obtains evidence of possible violations through surveillance activities, 
investor tips and complaints, other divisions and offices of the SEC, self-regulatory 
organization and other security industry sources, and media reports.490 As the SEC 
has regulatory, adjudicatory, and investigatory abilities, the same or similar powers 
can be granted to the independent agency of the Copyright Office. Congress may not 
give the Copyright Office the same expansive powers of the SEC, but the Copyright 
Office can have various limited regulatory, adjudicatory, and investigatory powers 
and work in conjunction with already established agencies such as the FTC and the 
DOJ.   
Establishing the Copyright Office as an independent agency is not a new proposal.  
In 2017, a bill of this nature was introduced by Representatives Tom Marino (R-PA) 
and Judy Chu (D-CA) and called the Copyright Office for the Digital Economy 
Act.491 The bill would have established the Copyright Office as an independent 
agency and would have made the Register of Copyrights a presidentially appointed 
position.492 Unfortunately, this bill never went before a vote and died in the 115th 
Congress.493 However, the Copyright Office’s establishment as an independent 
agency may still prove necessary to combat music streaming fraud and should be 
reintroduced with various changes.   
In the 2017 bill, the regulatory functions of the Copyright Office were limited to 
the copyright registration process.494 In a new introduction of the bill, the Copyright 
Office should be granted the regulatory ability to combat music streaming fraud as 
music streaming fraud impacts the overall economic conditions of rightsholders. As 
mentioned throughout this comment, music streaming fraud hurts the royalty 
distributions of all rightsholders as well as hurts the consuming public. This 
independent agency could create a regulation for digital music platforms, such as 
Spotify, to report any instance of fraud caught by the service. The Copyright Office 
would be free to establish a committee that analyzes these reports of fraud.   
 
 488. The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/role-
sec#:~:text=The%20U.%20S.%20Securities%20and%20Exchange,Facilitate%20capital%20formation (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
 489. How Investigations Work, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/enforce/how-investigations-work.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
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 491. The Copyright Office for the Digital Economy Act, H.R. 890, 115th Cong (2017). 
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 493. H.R. 890 (115th): Copyright Office for the Digital Economy Act, GOVTRAK, 
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This committee can also be established to investigate reports of fraud from people 
in the music industry as well as consumers. In this situation, those with evidence of 
potential fraud could report these activities to the enforcement division of the 
Copyright Office. Additionally, the Copyright Office could use substantiated media 
reports to launch investigations. If fraud were determined, the Copyright Office 
could submit the investigation’s findings to the FTC or DOJ for further investigation 
and prosecution. However, as the fraud impacts the royalty distribution of various 
rights holders, the investigation can be turned over to the Copyright Royalty Board 
for further determination on rates and rate regulations of the market.   
The Copyright Royalty Board, under 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F), must establish 
“rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been 
negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.”  In these 
determination of rates, the judges of the Copyright Royalty Board must consider and 
“base their decision on economic, competitive, and programming information 
presented by the parties,” including: (i) whether the use of a digital music service’s 
platform may substitute for or promote sales of a particular song or whether that use 
may otherwise interfere with or enhance a rightsholder’s other song revenue streams; 
and (ii) the relative roles of the rightsholder and the digital music service in a song 
and “the service made available to the public with respect to the relative creative 
contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost and risk.”495  
Fraudulent streams on a digital music platform would severely interfere and impact 
a rightsholder’s revenues from its song as well as may decrease overall market share 
of royalty distributions.  When an investigation finds fraud has impacted the royalty 
pool, this fraud limits creative works made available to the public, dramatically 
impacts fair returns of a rightsholder’s creative work under existing economic 
conditions and has a disruptive impact on the structure of the industry and 
competition. Additionally, fraud that disrupts the royalty pool may severely impact 
creative contributions to the market. If copyright owners cannot make a fair income 
in the market due to fraud, creatives may cease creating to find a fair income, or 
living wage, in other industries. One of the Copyright Royalty Board’s functions is 
to determine fair rates while considering economic conditions and the impacts of 
fraud on the market may severely impact these economic conditions.496 In cases of 
fraud, the Copyright Royalty Board may utilize its power to determine how the rate 
structure needs to be altered to account for the impact of fraud on the royalty pool.497 
For instance, the Copyright Royalty Board could require a recalculation of the 
royalty pool that excludes fraudulent streams and a redistribution of royalties based 
on this recalculation to rightsholders. In turn, this recalculation requirement could 
force the digital music streaming services to create more effective policing measures 
 
 495. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F) (2018). 
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to combat fraudulent practices on their sites. If an investigation found that the digital 
music service manipulated streams or participated in fraudulent practices to force 
lower royalty payouts to rightsholders, the Copyright Royalty Board498 could 
determine a penalty percentage on royalty payouts.   
The Copyright Office is best established as an independent agency to combat 
music streaming fraud. Under this establishment, the Copyright Office could regulate 
and investigate instances of potential fraud and based on the expertise of the 
department, best determine the appropriate steps when instances of music streaming 
fraud arise.   
XI. CONCLUSION  
As mentioned throughout this comment, there are many types of fraud affecting 
the music streaming marketplace. Third party fraudsters, rightsholders, artists and 
digital music platforms have all been accused of some form of playola or fraudulent 
practice. If the accusations of playola and the fraudulent acts of the digital music 
streaming platforms are true, the industry itself is left without an objective party that 
could determine an effective solution for the prevention of fraud on music streaming 
platforms without implicating themselves. Because a solution for music streaming 
fraud requires an unbiased determination of prevention, Congressional intervention 
and legislation is required.   
One possible solution is for Congress to initiate investigations and enact a statute 
that prevents and deters music streaming fraud. There are currently already 
established laws that serve as a possible starting point and show legislative history 
in the prevention of fraudulent activity in various markets including the anti-payola 
statute, FTC Act, and the CFAA. However, as seen with the anti-payola statute, a 
statute may only serve as words on paper as the industry and various would-be 
fraudsters find new practices to circumvent the language of the statute.   
A better possible Congressional solution to combat music streaming fraud is to 
establish the Copyright Office as an independent federal agency. With this action, 
the Copyright Office could be empowered to impose regulations on the industry that 
are specifically formulated to extinguish music streaming fraud and playola. 
Additionally, the Copyright Office could form an investigatory committee that would 
require digital music platforms to report any indications of fraud as well as 
investigate any reports of fraud by the music industry and consumers. The Copyright 
Office as a regulatory agency may be best equipped to identify, investigate, and 
prevent music streaming fraud.   
 
 498. Currently, the Copyright Royalty Board is appointed by the Librarian of Congress after consultation 
with the Register of Copyrights. As an independent agency, the Copyright Royalty Board would be appointed by 
the Register of Copyrights. The Copyright Royalty Board would move under the new independent agency 
structure and would no longer fall under the constructs of the Library of Congress. See 17 U.S.C. § 801(a). 
